UNIVERSAL ILE POLICY: CONCEPT, REALITY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Expert knowledge and the application of that knowledge have long been the hallmark of a profession. The primary boundary between a profession and an organization or bureaucracy is that a profession singularly develops and employs expert knowledge. The possession of expert knowledge gives the profession its singularity and its jurisdiction. Singularity is an essential piece because it establishes a profession's jurisdiction and its ownership of expertise in a select area. And the repository for this expert knowledge resides in its people. For, "those who learn and employ that knowledge in unique contexts are rightly described as professionals; in them lies the heart and soul of the profession." 1 These professionals continually learn, adapt and innovate through education, training and personal experiences.
Providing educational opportunities for professionals can be difficult because of other important requirements for the professional. This paper will focus on the difficulty of educating professionals, specifically the institutional education of U.S. Army majors. The author will discuss the impact of education in a profession, and enunciate why education is an integral part of maintaining a professional Army officer corps. The author will also describe the Army's recent policy change for Intermediate Level Education (ILE) for majors, argue its merits, and examine the current progress in reaching the policy's intended end state. Shortfalls in current procedures will be identified as well as the reasons why the Army has been unable to successfully implement this policy. Finally, the author will offer several recommendations, both short and long term to successfully realize the vision that was intended when the Army introduced the Universal ILE policy.
In order to remain relevant, a profession must not be content to rest on its current knowledge, but be driven to expand its knowledge and its applicability. The ability to better understand a complex and adaptive system will require professionals to process and correlate the mass of information to provide a means to evaluate its relevance, reliability and importance. 2 In this way they gain and expand their knowledge. And based on their experience, education, training and personality, professionals use their judgment to turn knowledge into understanding for although "we may know what is going on; we understand why." 3 The U.S. Army is currently undergoing a transformation to maintain its relevance and expertise for the future, emphasizing the requirement for full-spectrum capabilities to address whatever actions our adversaries take against us. 4 This transformation effort is changing the Army in several ways, from changes in headquarters and organizational structures, to development of several new pieces of equipment and platforms, to changes in doctrine and personnel policies. It is an immense undertaking, especially considering the Army's involvement in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Although the above-mentioned programs are the most visible of the initiatives being developed as part of this transformation, there is a far more important factor required for the Army to transform successfully to a relevant and ready campaign-quality force -that is education. For "transformation is first and foremost an intellectual exercise…therefore, the road to transformation begins with a strong program of education and leader development." 5 The CSA, General Peter J. Schoomaker, clearly understands this importance, since six of his sixteen focus areas for the Army directly relate to education. 6 The terms experience, training and education are often used to describe the elements of a military officer's professional development. With evolutionary learning, "the focus of our entire educational thrust shifts as we attempt to foster a capacity rather than fill a container with information." 8 For example, think of a glass of water. Maintenance learning deals with the amount of water present in the glass, always trying to fill the glass as full as possible. Evolutionary learning concerns itself with the capability of the glass to transform to accept more water than the original glass. Evolutionary learning concerns itself not only with the amount of water present in the glass, but also with the water not present in the glass -namely, the uncertainty. This is the other distinction between training and educating someone. Training addresses certainty, such as squads conducting battle drills, staffs employing the military decision making process (MDMP), or leaders reading field manuals; training takes known information to develop an appropriate response. In some ways, it takes a checklist or recipe approach, and it is not necessarily a bad approach. Battle drills allow small units to take concerted immediate action when attacked and the MDMP provides a construct for staff members to rely upon when developing courses of action for a specific mission. However, professional education goes much further, and seeks a context within which to apply knowledge and judgment providing a greater understanding of the overall issue. 12 The study group's report named seven strategic imperatives, and identified these as the key to success in order for the Army "to make substantial improvement in training and leader development." 13 Of these seven imperatives, five relate directly or indirectly to education. Creveld and Douglas A. Macgregor, believe attendance to a staff college should be determined through competitive examinations with Macgregor favoring a system that affords an officer with three opportunities in three years. Both agree attendance and successful completion of a staff college must be used as a vehicle for selection to promotion and further command opportunities. 20 However, in espousing this view, they both miss a key point -that of the profession's responsibility to educate its officers. No one will disagree that an individual's growth in a profession relies heavily on self-education; it is still a key pillar for an officer's professional development. Creveld and Macgregor place a huge importance on self-education, which is reflected in their insistence on an officer's entrance examination to a staff college. But they and others who agree with them see acceptance to a staff college as a qualifier for better promotion and command opportunities and miss the premise that the Army has already used a qualifierthe officer's selection and promotion to major. Therefore, having promoted an officer to major, the Army has the inherent responsibility to institutionally educate the officer with the potential for higher rank, for "as an officer progresses, the educational demands of the profession grow and the intellectual component increases." 21 Simply put, the concept should be if the Army believes an officer merits promotion, it is incumbent upon the Army to professionally educate the officer on higher responsibilities to help ensure both the officer's and profession's continued growth and success. In just this short time, the backlog is estimated to increase over 2,000 officers -and this is a conservative estimate. 24 The reasons for this increasing backlog, to include how the Army got to this point, both rely heavily on increasing requirements for Army Transformation and GWOT.
Army Transformation has added significant new positions at the grade of major. Combined with the under-accession of officer year groups in the mid-90's, this initially created a large shortage of majors to fill these new modular requirements. In addition, the requirements for majors in support of GWOT also continued to grow. Not all of these requirements were solely the growth seen in modular units deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan; significant growth was seen in the "off-the-book" requirements, namely those Army requirements that were not listed on the Personnel Management Authorizations Document (PMAD). 25 These assignments continued to grow from 2003 to the present and can best be viewed in the 12-month temporary change of station (TCS) assignments into theater, specifically the number of majors assigned to the transition teams and headquarters elements in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
To deal with this shortage at the grade of major, which approached 80% fill in FY04, the Army elected to accelerate the promotion of majors. This was accomplished by lowering the pin-on point for majors from 11.5 years to 10 years and accounts for the two major promotion There is also a school of thought that the backlog overstates the problem of ILE attendance. The proponents of this argument think of ILE as a "gate" to reach prior to selection to lieutenant colonel. In other words, as long as an officer completes ILE prior to the LTC promotion board, the Army has fulfilled its responsibility in making him competitive for advancement. However ILE is much more than a gate to meet for promotion. It is an educational requirement -a necessity -for those officers attaining the field grade rank of major.
Although the education attained at the staff college is important for a LTC, it is even more important for a less experienced major. This education must not be viewed as a "gate," but an essential element of an officer's professional development entering the field grade rank, regardless of personal experiences. As the ATLDP Study Group identified, "Many officers have not been properly developed at their current level or position before they are moved to a higher position for which they have been neither educated [n]or trained." 29 The long-term goal should be to send officers to ILE prior to the end of their second year as majors; in this way, they can employ the knowledge gained at ILE for the majority of their time as a major.
Sadly, the Army is not close to achieving this goal. In fact, the Army's inability to fulfill the Universal ILE policy for its field grade officers is already having a noticeable effect, foreshadowed by the recent statistics on the LTC promotion board. In each of the LTC promotion boards from FY03, FY04 and FY05, only two majors without resident and nonresident ILE were selected for promotion. In each year, the total selection rate for non-ILE lieutenant colonels was .3% across above, below and primary zones. 30 The selection rates for non-ILE lieutenant colonels in the FY06 LTC board drastically increased. Those same officers without ILE were selected for promotion at almost a 7% rate, 41 total officers, across the three promotion zones, with the primary zone select rate of 25%. 31 These statistics do not reflect an increase of non-ILE officers presenting themselves to the board -not yet. For these four boards, the range of non-ILE majors in each year group, primary zone only, was from 88 to 134 officers.
The major reason for the increase in the selection rate for non-ILE officers was the increase in the overall selection rate for LTCs, increasing from 79% in the FY03 board to 91% in Failure by the Army's leadership to communicate its intentions to its officers may have an unwelcome effect. It is possible that officers who are eligible for ILE will become frustrated and disgruntled if they are repeatedly told that they must be deferred because of operational requirements. It is not that the officers do not understand the deferments; they acknowledge the importance of operational requirements and the vast majority are willing to do their part. But with the lack of communication from the senior leadership, many officers may also fear they are being left behind. The simple reality for them is that their commanders or assignment officers are deferring them from ILE attendance because of operational requirements. Yet these same officers are reading articles and posture statements by senior leaders which state that education is the most important part of transformation. This may leave many officers with the perception that the Army is not as committed to them as they believe they are to the Army. 34 In approving the policy of Universal ILE, the Army's leadership created a vision for change. The previous policy of selecting the top 50% of majors for attendance at Fort
Leavenworth was replaced with the concept that all majors should attend resident education.
But announcing the policy and making tremendous strides at Fort Leavenworth and the other ILE sites will not change the culture of professional education and development in the Army.
Only when the senior leadership continues to share and reinforce its vision to the officer corps, and the change is seen and realized by individual officers will Army officers truly embrace the new culture.
Recommendations to Reduce the Backlog…and Sustain Universal ILE in the Future
The current ILE situation with unfilled seats and a large backlog in the foreseeable future is untenable. Continuing along the current path will result in thousands of officers unable to attend ILE prior to their LTC promotion board. As the Army's leadership begins to develop a suitable course of action to address the backlog as well as the long-term viability of Universal ILE, some of the following options may be offered as solutions but the Army's leadership must reject these actions.
One possible option for reducing the backlog is to focus attendance on those officers from the senior year groups to get them ILE-qualified prior to their LTC board. In order to meet this goal, the Army must start filling the seats at Fort Leavenworth prior to AY10. This option emphasizes the ILE requirement as a gate for promotion and its selling point is that it will cause the least cultural change in the Army. Proponents will argue this option follows the Universal Another method may be to grant constructive credit to select groups of officers, meaning the Army will recognize the officer as ILE-certified without attendance to the staff college.
Although constructive credit will most likely be needed in the future, there are two options that the Army leadership must not approve. First, in order to reduce the backlog and begin to assign majors to ILE in their first two years of attaining the rank of major, some may suggest an option of granting constructive credits to all majors in the senior four, possibly five year groups. In this option, the Army would provide constructive credit to officers in senior year groups in order to focus ILE attendance on the junior majors. However, by using only a criteria based on officers' seniority with no appreciation of previous education, training and experiences, the Army would lose the opportunity to educate officers within those senior year groups who may truly need it the most.
A second option may be to provide constructive credit for officers who have been deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly Kuwait. The justification for this course of action would be that these officers possess more real-world experiences than their peers, and are therefore more prepared for follow-on assignments and positions. Although this option takes into account officers' experiences based on deployment history, it once again separates midlevel officers on one criterion -deployment history. As stated previously, officers' experiences during deployments are different and unique, based in part on their ranks and positions when deployed, their areas of operations, the timing of their deployments and the specific situations inherent on the ground. In addition, assuming these officers' experiences prepare them for future assignments and responsibilities without attendance to ILE may be unwise; it would prevent the opportunity to educate officers with deployments who may truly need the ILE experience the most.
A third option that could gain momentum would be to encourage officers to complete a non-resident ILE and AOWC course. In this option, the senior leadership admits the Army cannot provide resident ILE instruction for all majors per the current policy, at least for a time.
Majors would be encouraged to take a non-resident course, much like officers did previously who were not selected for resident attendance. Most likely the senior four or five year groups would be targeted for a non-resident program so the Army could begin to focus resident attendance on junior majors. Implicit, yet unstated, is that senior majors take the non-resident course to ensure they are fully prepared for their LTC board in case the Army simply can not get them to the Leavenworth course. This option may appear disingenuous since the Army's leadership established Universal ILE because they saw the need for every officer to attend a staff college. Reversing this decision a few years later could hurt the credibility of the senior leadership and may make a bad situation even worse by showing a lack of commitment to midgrade officers and their professional education.
The preferred solution to address the Army's inability to implement the Universal ILE policy is much more complex, time consuming and precise. The first step is the easiest; yet incredibly important. The CSA should address the Universal ILE issue with the officer corps.
The key here is communication, not resolution. Even remarks simply acknowledging the issue and its importance to the affected officers would be a start. At least the officer corps would know their senior leadership is concerned about the ILE backlog and is working towards a solution. The remarks could simply be:
I recognize that we have been unsuccessful in implementing the Universal ILE policy the Army announced for AY03/04. The reasons for our inability to fill the ILE seats at Fort Leavenworth are many, but rest primarily with our requirements for both GWOT and Army Transformation. The backlog of majors awaiting attendance to ILE has grown to such an extent that we will be unable to ensure attendance for officers currently in the grade of major to resident ILE and AOWC at Fort Leavenworth. This will not be an easy situation to correct, yet it is imperative that we move forward in implementing Universal ILE attendance for all majors at the first practical opportunity. As an Army, we have an obligation to professionally develop our leaders; but we are currently falling short in achieving ILE attendance for some majors in the Army. This is an extremely important issue for me, and I and the rest of the Army's senior leadership will produce a viable and concrete course of action to help us achieve the vision that was intended with Universal ILE attendance.
With this announcement, the senior leadership should formulate a plan to 1) develop a strategy to ensure officers receive ILE education; 2) apply constructive credit to selected officers There has been, in the past, generally one school of thought for the officers attending Fort Leavenworth; that is, they are the "best and the brightest," or officers with the greatest potential.
This was reflected in the previous CGSC policy when a board selected the top 50% of a year group to attend the staff college. Current Army commanders and leaders may fall back on this approach unless fresh thought and perspective are introduced into the culture. It will be important to break this paradigm by giving constructive credit to the most experienced, knowledgeable and educated officers and focus on providing resident ILE and AOWC at Fort Leavenworth for those officers who need it the most. This approach is more than just tectonic plates shifting and grinding against each other; this is no small change. This is the equivalent of a major earthquake, a huge cultural shift which changes the landscape of thinking about the Officer Education System. Before this approach is discarded, think of the advantages of sending, quite literally, the bottom half of a year group. The potential for learning and growth at ILE and AOWC is substantially higher for officers who may not be as knowledgeable or professionally developed as their peers, and therefore have much more to gain from the experience. In other words, the Army should not bestow constructive credit on officers who have the most to gain from ILE and AOWC, the so-called "bottom half" of a year group; the constructive credit should be applied to those officers who have exhibited they have the experience, the education and the maturity to continue to serve well in the Army, even without resident ILE and AOWC at Fort Leavenworth.
Selection for constructive credit should not be developed with simply one criterion, such as seniority or deployment experience as previously discussed. In order to select those most The final step for consideration by the board would be a written evaluation by the officer's current rater and senior rater. This evaluation would be done once for the initial board, reflecting the chain of command's assessment of the officer's professional development, experience and education. Evaluations would be developed solely for the constructive credit board and completed for all majors and promotable captains for the year the board is being held. To prevent this written evaluation requirement from being included in follow-on boards, raters and senior raters would be required to specifically rate an officer's aptitude for ILE constructive credit in their portion of the officer's OER which would be viewed by subsequent ILE constructive credit boards. Although this method will not eliminate the backlog in one year, it will account for the continued education and experience being gained by those eligible officers. The Army should continue the board annually until it determines the backlog has been sufficiently reduced to the point the Army can provide OPCF majors with the opportunity for ILE attendance at Fort Leavenworth within the first two years of their promotion to major.
Finally, the Army must begin to fill all 1,300 seats at Fort Leavenworth. As a start, TRADOC has already begun to start two classes a year, in August and in February, to make it easier to get additional majors to ILE and AOWC, considering the operational deployment cycle.
But more must be done to achieve this result. The Army must leverage the Army Force Majors in assignments in the institutional Army should also be considered for attendance to ILE based on their unit's priority. The primary onus must be on the operational Army because of phasing included in ARFORGEN, and not on the institutional Army as many would prefer it.
Employing this methodology will leverage ARFORGEN phasing and allow more officers the opportunity to attend ILE and AOWC at Fort Leavenworth.
These recommendations represent a change in culture with respect to OES and may not
be met with open arms by some leaders in the Army. However, incorporating these recommendations supports the Universal ILE policy and provides the best opportunity for the Army to educate officers who most need the education the Fort Leavenworth resident course provides until the ILE backlog is significantly reduced. To ensure the Universal ILE policy remains viable in the long term, the Army's senior leadership must leverage the reset phase inherent in the ARFORGEN model to provide adequate numbers of majors to attend resident staff college. As important as these officers' presence is in units during the reset phase, their presence should not overshadow the importance of their institutional education. By emphasizing and enforcing the Universal ILE policy, the Army will posture itself for the future by providing educated, creative and adaptive leaders to lead the U.S. Army in service to the nation.
